After September 11, the Bush administration's national security strategy was guided by the idea that because failed nation-states such as Afghanistan could be used as terrorist operating bases and recruiting grounds it was necessary to use military force to eliminate such threats and engage in the long-term work of nation-building in order to win the Global War on Terror. The trouble with this assumption is that there is no shortage of effectively ungoverned places around the world, nor are they necessary for the development of terrorist networks. The advanced security measures protecting many Western metropolises present numerous challenges to terrorist organizations but with the proper tactics and precautions they can be quickly circumvented.

What terrorists do need is a reason to exist as well as a reason for others to join their movement. This should give the Obama administration reason to reconsider its expansion of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. It will inevitably result in increased casualties as Afghan civilians are caught in the middle of the U.S.-Taliban cross-fire, forced to take sides in a conflict many seem to want no part of. Using a butcher's knife- i.e. a conventional military force -to do the work of a scalpel -i.e. special operations forces in conjunction with indigenous and close air support -is more likely to drive the Afghan population to the Taliban and eventually Al Qaeda than it is to win hearts and minds. Add to this the feudal animosity that exists between ethnic Pashtuns living in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the Pakistani elite- whom the U.S. is backing -and you have the foundations of failure on both sides of the border.

Though the current and evolving relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda is a murky subject, it seems safe to say that the Taliban remain an ideological problem with only local ambitions of power. However brutal and repressive they may be, so long as they do not align themselves ideologically with Al Qaeda they are not a national security problem and therefore a continued conventional military presence in Afghanistan is not vital to the preservation of our national interests. Our ability to transition to renewable energy and pay off our politically compromising national debt as quickly as possible is a much more pressing concern.

On the Pakistani side of the border, 500,000 refugees are fleeing the areas of conflict between the Pakistani military and the tribal leaders. This will have enormous costs for a country already in danger of financial collapse. A smarter, more precise, more cost-effective approach is necessary to eliminate the core threat, which is Al Qaeda rather than the Taliban.

Therefore the Obama administration should (1) Support the Pakistani government's efforts to contain the tribal leaders on its side of the border while strongly pressuring for economic reforms necessary to neutralize the Islamists' appeal in the first place. (Recall that the South Vietnamese government's refusal to carry out land reforms was what attracted people to the Communists during the Vietnam War); (2) Minimize the conventional U.S. military presence in Afghanistan; (3) Direct military commanders to negotiate with Afghani tribal leaders for use of their territory to conduct low-profile Special Operations Forces missions; (4) Focus on intelligence collection and infiltration of Al Qaeda with indigenous support in order to carry out targeted killings of key leaders. The skilled use of informants will have the effect of introducing distrust and paranoia into the organization and will accelerate its dissolution from within as its communications break down; (5) Support the expansion of local economic development and trade between more stable areas within Afghanistan with the intent of engineering economic spill-over into the less stable areas of the country. This will over the long term undermine the Taliban's power.

In short, the human and financial cost of an expanded military conflict in Afghanistan appears highly unlikely to yield whatever benefits the Obama administration is seeking. The mental and physical health of our troops is being exhausted with apallingly inadequate VA resources to support them when they get home. The United States is in massive debt with a still-contracting economy and increasingly hesitant foreign creditors. A conventional military force is the wrong tool for conducting an effective counterterrorist mission and is in fact more likely to strengthen Al Qaeda's hand. Given our overall position, it seems clear that now is not the time for investing in nation-building when our own nation is collapsing around us.